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I. Background 
 A wealth of economic research has documented an increase in the returns to education in 
the 1980s.  Most of this research has concentrated on the relative returns to a bachelor’s degree 
relative to lower levels of education.   Since the 1980s, there has been a well-documented 
increase in returns to a college education relative to lower levels of schooling.  The trend in 
relative earnings for bachelor’s degree holders relative to high school graduates between 1976 
and 1998 is illustrated in Figure 1.  The bachelor’s degree premium over a high school degree 
rose from 25% in 1976 to 45% in 1998 with the gains beginning in the early 1980s.   Not as 
commonly known is that returns for those who entered or completed some postgraduate training 
rose even more rapidly.  Over the period, the premium earned by graduate degree recipients 
above the average for those with bachelor’s degrees rose from 32% to 67%. 
 This study has two objectives.  The first is to measure the returns to postgraduate 
training, controlling for likely joint choices of years of schooling and their associated returns.  
Past estimates reported by Jaeger and Page (1996) and Graham and Smith (2005) imply very low 
annualized returns to graduate education of around 5% per year.  However, those estimates may 
be clouded by nonrandom sorting on ability.  The second objective is to determine if the increase 
in returns to postgraduate training can be explained by changes in the quality of more recent 
cohorts of graduate students relative to their older colleagues or if we need to seek other 
explanations for the rising returns to graduate education. 
 We focus on the roles of quantitative and verbal skills on education choice and observed 
returns to those choices.  Several studies have documented changes in the returns to quantitative 
skills in the 1980s.  Murnane, Willett and Levy (1995) found that rising returns to mathematics 
skills can explain a substantial fraction of the observed increase in returns to college between 
1978 and 1986.  Grogger and Eide (1995) and Levine and Zimmerman (1995) also reported that 
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standardized mathematics scores or having taken more mathematics classes had a significant 
positive impact on women’s wages but not men’s wages.   
 The mechanism by which mathematical skills influence wages is not clear.  It is likely 
that stronger quantitative skills are complementary with the use of information technologies that 
are widely suspected to have raised worker productivity and wages.  However, quantitative skills 
may also affect the type of training individuals receive.  Willis and Rosen (1979),  Murnane, 
Willett and Levy (1995) and Taber (2001) all found that stronger mathematical skills in high 
school increased the likelihood of attending college.  Paglin and Rufolo (1990) found that 
quantitative skills influenced choice of graduate major.   
 There is a presumption that quantitative and verbal skills increase in importance as the 
education level rises, and so changes in the value of these skills would be expected to affect the 
measured returns to post-graduate training.  Two effects are potentially at work: 
1)  Rising returns to cognitive skills may have increased the opportunity costs of 
attending graduate school, limiting incentives to pursue post-graduate education in the 
areas where the returns are rising the most rapidly.  Consequently, the most able students 
opt not to pursue graduate education in favor of capturing returns to those skills in jobs 
they can acquire with a bachelor’s degree. 
2) The marginal product of cognitive skills may have risen atypically in post-graduate 
training, raising the returns to graduate training relative to lower education levels.   
These two possibilities would have opposite effects on incentives to attend graduate school and 
on observed wages.  The former would suggest that the observed wage differentials between 
graduate and undergraduate degree holders would understate the true returns to graduate 
education because the earnings of those stopping at the bachelor’s degree exceed the opportunity 
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costs of those who attended graduate school.  The latter would suggest the most able would 
attend graduate school, suggesting that the observed wage differential between graduate and 
undergraduate degree holders is an upward biased measure of the returns to graduate school.  
The comprehensive review by Card (1999) suggests that studies that control for nonrandom 
sorting into lower levels of education routinely obtain higher estimated returns to schooling 
when employing instrumental variables than from ordinary least squares estimation.1  To our 
knowledge, previous studies of returns to graduate education have not explored the direction of 
bias from nonrandom sorting into graduate school. 
 There are many studies that examine incentives to enter individual majors and the returns 
to those decisions.  However, more general studies of returns to graduate education are rare.2 The 
main advantage to a general study of returns to graduate education is that if quantitative or verbal 
skills sort individuals across degrees, we need to have the sample cover the universe of students 
and not just a specific field or major.  In addition, it is easier to compare estimated returns to an 
education level to the literature on returns to high school or college that do not distinguish by 
field than it is to compare returns to a specific graduate degree in, say,  law or sociology.  
 Our findings suggest that least squares estimates of the returns to graduate education  are 
strongly biased downward by nonrandom sorting into graduate school.  The nonrandom sorting 
occurs on both verbal and quantitative skills: bachelor’s degree recipients in majors with stronger 
quantitative skills and weaker verbal skills are more likely to take a job after the bachelor’s 
degree rather than going for further schooling.  Consequently, the observed average earnings for 
those opting for employment with a bachelor’s degree overstate the average earnings of those 
opting to enter graduate school.  Rising returns to quantitative skills and falling returns to verbal 
skills suggest that the downward bias in least squares estimates of returns to graduate education 
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has been increasing over time.  Correcting for nonrandom sorting raises estimated returns to 
levels similar to or larger than the returns to a bachelor’s degree. 
II. Estimation Model 
 Our analysis begins with the standard log-earnings framework: 
1)   ln i i S i X i iy S X uμβ β μ β= + + + , 
where ln yi is the observed earnings of the ith individual; Si is the observed schooling level, taken 
as a vector of dummy variables with the value of one indicating the individual’s highest degree 
earned; Xi is a vector of individual characteristics; iμ  is an individual-specific ability component 
that influences earnings; and ui is a random error term that is uncorrelated with Si , Xi and iμ . 
The Sβ  and Xβ  represent the estimated returns to schooling levels and individual attributes, 
respectively.   
 If iμ  is not observable by the econometrician, then (1) becomes 
1′ )  ln ;i i S i X i i i iy S X uμβ β ε ε μ β= + + = + , 
where the error term iε  will include both purely random components and unmeasured individual 
ability.  If that ability is correlated with schooling success, then exclusion of iμ  from the 
estimating equation will lead to E( ) E( ) 0i i i iS S με μ β= ≠ , and so the estimates of Sβ  and Xβ  will 
be subject to missing variables bias.  
 In our application, individuals decide between stopping at the bachelor’s degree or 
continuing on for additional schooling.  The choice set at the time the individual finishes 
undergraduate training includes four schooling levels: Bachelor’s, Master’s, Doctorate and 
Professional degree (mainly law or medicine).  These choices are denoted respectively by 
subscripts B, M, D, and P.  For simplicity, we consider these choices mutually exclusive, and so 
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we only consider the choice of the highest degree earned.  This avoids complications related to 
sequential educational choices. 
 The schooling decision involves selecting the option that maximizes utility.  This can be 
written as Si =max (SBi, SMi, SDi, SPi) where Sli is the utility from schooling choice l.  Although the 
utility levels are not observable, we can observe how the elements of Sli affect the probability of 
selecting schooling choice l. 
 Suppose that the individual selects schooling level Si at least in part on the basis of 
expected earnings at that education level.  Then the individual will use knowledge of Xi and iμ  to 
forecast what he expects to earn from each of the four educational choices.  Suppose also that 
there is a vector Zi that contains factors that shift the individual’s taste for or cost of schooling 
choice l.  Then utility from each choice Sli can be approximated by  
(2)  li li X li Z li liS X Z vμθ θ μ θ= + + + ;   l = B, M, D, P, 
where vli  may include omitted variables, measurement errors, or specification errors of functional 
choice, and it is assumed to be independent of observed variables. 
Now, even if E( ) 0i iS μμ β = , direct estimation of (1) will yield biased estimates if E(vli ui) ≠ 0.   
This endogeneity bias is caused by the joint selection of years of schooling with the expected 
returns from that schooling.  A large literature on returns to schooling suggests that both sources 
of bias, missing measures of ability and endogeneity of the schooling choice, are likely to exist. 
However, the past literature has not established the magnitude of these biases in the context of 
estimated returns to postgraduate education.  Consequently, we need to derive a mechanism to 
address the two potential sources of bias. 
A. Instruments 
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 To solve the problem, we follow two strategies commonly employed in the literature.   
First, we use measures of the direct cost of postgraduate education such as tuition levels or the 
likelihood of getting support graduate students in the year of receipt of the bachelor’s degree.3  
These measures are included as elements of Zi that are believed to alter the probability of 
continuing in school but may not affect what individuals expect to earn after completing school.  
 We also included measures of parental education as elements of Zi.  Card (1999) argued 
that parental education might not be a legitimate instrument for years of schooling because 
parental education is correlated with unobserved individual ability, even if parental education 
does not directly affect earnings.  His argument suggested that when parental education is used 
as an instrument for years of schooling, the estimated returns would be biased upward. We found 
that when parental education was treated as an element of Xi that enter both the schooling and 
earnings equations, estimated returns were even larger when parental education was used as an 
instrument, although the differences were not large.  Consequently, use of parental education as 
an instrument for years of schooling does not appear to bias upward estimated returns.  Joint test 
of overidentification failed to reject our use of the tuition measures and parental education 
variables as instruments, and so we report the estimates that exclude parental education from Xi .  
Results from other specifications are available on request. 
B. Major-level versus individual-level ability 
 One reason our measures of parental education appear not to cause problems may be that 
we are able to incorporate measures of verbal and quantitative ability into equations (1) and (2) 
that are typically missing in other studies.  Let individual ability be given by  
(3) Mli l iμ μ η= +    
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where Mlμ   is the vector of average mathematical and verbal skills associated with the 
individual’s undergraduate major and iη  is an individual-specific ability component that does not 
vary in productivity across schooling levels. The iη would not affect choice of schooling level. 
However, verbal and mathematical skills can have different productivities at different schooling 
levels.  Variation in Mlμ  across majors at one point in time or across cohorts can affect the 
graduate school entry decision. Elements of Zi can still serve as legitimate instruments for years 
of schooling provided that E(Ziη i) = 0. 
 Inserting equation (3) into equation (2), we obtain   
(4)    Sli  =  Xliθ x +Zliθ Z + ( Ml iμ η+ ) μθ  + vli,  
             = V (Xli, Zli, Mlμ ) + liζ   ; V (Xli, Zli, Mlμ ) = Xliθ x +Zliθ Z + Ml μμ θ ,  liζ  =  vli + η i μθ  , l = 
B, M, D, P.  
Therefore an individual chooses an alternative l over B if *liI
 ≥  0 where 
(5)  * ( , , )Mli li li l liI g X Z μ ω= − ; ( , , ) ( , , ) ( , , )M M Mli li l li li l Bi Bi Bg X Z V X Z V X Zμ μ μ= − , lu Bi liv vω = − . 
The probability an individual chooses a schooling level l over B is 
(6) Pr[ *liI ≥ 0] = Pr[ ( , , )Mli li l lig X Z μ ω− ≥ 0] 
                      = Pr[ ( , , )Mli li li lg X Zω μ≤ ]. 
If the liω  are drawn independently from an extreme value distribution, then (4) can be estimated 
using multinomial logit.  The parameter estimates will generate predicted probabilities that 
individual i will select any of the four options SBi, SMi, SDi, and SPi.  Three of these are inserted 
into (1) in place of the endogenous Si to generate unbiased estimates of sβ  under the maintained 
hypothesis that E(Zi vli) = E(Ziη i) = 0. 4 
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 This two-step procedure is inefficient because it does not incorporate the sampling errors 
in the parameter estimation of the multinomial logit estimates of (4) into the estimation of the log 
earnings equation (1).  We correct the second-stage standard errors using a bootstrapping 
procedure in which the two-step estimation was replicated 100 times, sampling with 
replacement, and sampling variation in the resulting estimates used to compute the second-stage 
standard errors.   
 If major-specific skills at the bachelor’s degree level are increasing in market value, then 
they will tend to lower incentives to pursue graduate work in that field.  Conversely, majors 
whose skills are falling in value at the bachelor’s level will have disproportionately high numbers 
of graduate students.  If this sorting effect drives lower earning bachelor’s degree recipients into 
graduate school and drives higher earning bachelor’s degree recipients out of graduate school, it 
would tend to depress estimated returns to graduate work.  If true, then least squares estimates of 
the returns to graduate school that ignored the role of major-specific ability measures would tend 
to understate the true returns.  Our empirical work provides evidence consistent with this sorting 
story. 
III. Data 
 The primary data source for this study is the Scientist and Engineer Statistics Data 
System (SESTAT) collected by the National Science Foundation (NSF).  The 1993 wave of 
SESTAT also incorporated the 1993 National Survey of College Graduates, a once-per-decade 
survey that also covered fields outside of the sciences and engineering.   The full sample includes 
133,399 individuals who received a bachelor’s degree between 1939 and 1992.  Our working 
sample excludes individuals who received the bachelor’s degree before 1963 or after 1986.  The 
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1963 limit was necessitated by the lack of information on Graduate Records Exam (GRE) scores 
by major before 1963.  The 1986 limit was imposed because we needed to give bachelor’s 
degree recipients sufficient time to enter and complete higher degrees.  Of the 84,595 individuals 
whose bachelor’s degrees are between 1963 and 1986, we exclude 20% because of missing 
information required for the analysis, with three-quarters of these dropped because of missing 
salary information.  That leaves us with a working sample of 67,565 individuals who received a 
bachelor’s degree between 1963 and 1986.  We use sample weights so that our subsample can 
replicate means for the relevant universe: the population of all bachelor’s degree recipients in the 
United States between 1963 and 1986. 
 Table 1 includes summary statistics on the variables included in the analysis.  The 
dependent variables include the natural logarithm of annual salary in 1993 and a series of 
dummy variables indicating highest degree earned.  Earnings of all college graduates in 1993 
averaged just under $54,000.  Bachelor’s recipients averaged $48,000 while Master’s recipients 
averaged $53,000, Ph.D.s averaged $60,000 and those with professional degrees averaged 
$84,000.  Fifty-five percent of the college graduate population did not earn a degree beyond the 
bachelor’s level.  Twenty-nine percent had a Master’s degree, 10 percent held professional 
degrees, and 6 percent had doctorates. 
 Variables included in the demographic vector Xi are potential work experience (1993 – 
graduation year of highest degree), gender, citizenship, and racial and ethnic dummy variables.  
We also included information on whether the individual was raised in a rural area.  Tastes for 
graduate education as well as the opportunity costs and anticipated returns from postgraduate 
training are likely to vary across these demographic factors. 5 
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 The vector Zi includes average real medical school and graduate school tuition, and the 
percentage of self-supporting graduate students for the year the individual received the first 
undergraduate diploma.  Due to data availability, these measures are averaged across all 
postgraduate degree programs.  This means that we only have time series and not cross sectional 
variation in the direct costs of postgraduate schooling.6  Even so, because undergraduates in a 
given major can select from many different graduate degree programs, major-specific 
information would be endogenous.   Data on tuition and availability of graduate support were 
collected from the National Center for Education Statistics.  The probability of pursuing 
postgraduate education should be lower for those receiving their bachelor’s degrees in years 
where real tuition levels are high or the probability of receiving support is low.   
 Because information on individual bachelor’s degree major and year of graduation, we 
can append information on the average GRE mathematics and verbal score for the college major 
in the year of graduation.7   The GRE scores are used to approximate the skill content of the 
major.  These measures are not fixed over time, as can be seen in Figure 2.  Average verbal 
scores rose until 1975 and then fell thereafter.  Average quantitative scores rose about 12 percent 
until 1975, retreated slightly over the next ten years, and then resumed modest growth.   
 Over time, the fraction of test takers from foreign countries has increased, and this 
may artificially change the average verbal and mathematics scores.  To hold constant the 
composition of foreign graduate students taking the GRE, we regressed the GRE scores by major 
on the proportion of foreign doctoral graduates in the major six year earlier.8  The residual 
represents changes in the skill content of college graduates holding fixed the proportion of 
foreign test takers.  These corrected GRE time paths are also shown in Figure 2.  The corrected 
verbal GRE path lies above the observed path as one would expect, but the shape is very similar 
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to the uncorrected path.  However, the corrected quantitative GRE path shows a much steeper 
decline in average scores after 1975 and a much steeper rebound after 1986.    The timing of the 
decline in verbal and quantitative GRE scores occurs about four years after the decline in 12th 
grade scores on the Iowa Test of Basic Skills reported by Bishop (1989). 
 Average GRE scores vary across majors, genders, races, and education levels.  This 
variation provides cross-sectional variation in the skill content of bachelor’s degree recipients.  
As shown in Table 2, students whose highest degrees were at the bachelor’s level were in majors 
with the highest quantitative scores and the lowest verbal scores.  This is consistent with the 
speculation that the sorting into graduate school may be based in part on cognitive skill content 
of majors as proxied by GRE scores. Undergraduate majors in the sciences and engineering had 
markedly higher average quantitative scores while Engineering and Business had markedly 
lower average verbal scores.  If returns to these skills have changed over time, there will be 
asymmetric changes in the relative incentives to seek post-graduate training across majors.  
Because demographic groups concentrate in different majors, there is cross-sectional variation in 
major GRE scores by race, ethnicity and gender.  Men tended to be in majors with higher 
average quantitative GREs and marginally lower verbal GREs.   Asians also concentrate in 
majors with high quantitative and low verbal scores. 
 Together, the time series and cross-sectional variation in GRE scores should be 
sufficiently large to assess whether changes in cognitive skills developed in undergraduate 
programs have a role in explaining changes in the returns to post-graduate education in the 
United States. We proceed to that exercise in the next section. 
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IV. Estimation Results 
A. Schooling Choices 
 Our primary interest is in deriving estimates of equation (1), but we also have an interest 
in assessing how bachelor degree recipients decide to continue on in school.  Results from the 
weighted multinomial logit estimation of the schooling choice equation are reported in Table 3.  
The estimation uses the bachelor’s degree as the reference group, and so positive (negative) signs 
indicate an increased (decreased) probability of the educational choice relative to stopping at the 
B.A. level.  
 Family background variables are highly significant in influencing the choice of whether 
or not to pursue and advanced degree.  As mother’s and father’s education levels rise, the 
probability of seeking an advanced degree increases.  The effect is strongest at the PhD level.  
B.A. recipients who grew up in rural areas are less likely to pursue an advanced degree.  U.S. 
citizens are less likely to seek a Master’s or doctorate but are more likely to pursue a professional 
degree.  Asians are more likely than whites to pursue a Master’s or Ph.D., while Hispanics and 
Blacks are less likely to pursue the doctorate.  
 Measures of expected cost of pursuing a graduate degree performed as expected.  
Individuals who received the bachelor’s degree in years with higher real graduate and medical 
school tuition levels were less likely to pursue an advanced degree.  However, the negative effect 
is only statistically significant for the effect of graduate school tuition on PhD or Professional 
degrees.  The percentage of self-supporting graduate students significantly decreased the 
probability of pursuing all three advanced degrees.  We also interacted the probability of self-
support with a measure of parental education with the expectation that parents with higher 
education levels might moderate the adverse effects of a low probability of receiving graduate 
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support.9 That expectation was also realized in that all signs on the interacted terms were positive, 
although only marginally significant in predicting the likelihood of obtaining a professional 
degree. The joint significance test of the six elements of Zi easily rejects the null hypothesis of  
no effect.  Later, we found modest evidence that real graduate tuition may not be a legitimate 
instrument.  Although our results are not changed when we treat it as an instrument, we restricted 
our set of instruments to the remaining five.  These also easily passed joint tests of  
significance.10 
 GRE scores have an interesting impact on the probability of pursuing a higher degree.  
The simulations in Figure 3 show how the probability of selecting each degree level changes 
with the average GRE scores for undergraduate majors.  Undergraduates in majors with higher 
verbal scores are more likely to pursue the doctorate or professional degrees.   However, 
undergraduates in majors characterized by stronger quantitative skills are much more likely to 
complete their schooling at the bachelor’s degree level.   In separate regressions, we found that 
the  impact of the quantitative score on schooling choice has been stable over time.  If returns to 
quantitative skills have risen, the impacts must have been neutral across education levels.  The 
marginal effects of GRE verbal scores increased slightly over time, but the effect is much smaller 
than the quantitative score. 
 We show how changes in average quantitative and verbal skills have affected 
postgraduate degree attainment in Figure 4a-c.  These simulated effects of the multinomial logit 
model hold all factors at their sample means except for the GRE scores which are allowed to 
vary at historical levels.  Simulations are carried through to 1993 because all necessary 
information was available, although the parameter estimates are based on data just through 1986.  
 The most dramatic changes are due to changes in the GRE quantitative score.  As shown 
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in Figure 4a, rising average quantitative GRE scores have led to an increasing proportion of 
students stopping at the bachelor’s degree since 1985 while fewer students have sought doctoral 
or professional degrees.  The finding that the marginal impact of the GRE quantitative score does 
not vary across graduation cohorts suggests that this is a result of rising quantitative skills and 
not rising returns to those skills.  Because verbal scores raise the likelihood of seeking advanced 
degrees, rising GRE verbal scores in the 1960s and 1970s tended to increase the likelihood of 
entering graduate school.  However, the erosion in verbal skills since 1975 has reversed the 
pattern.   By 1993, most of the increase in predicted probability of seeking advanced degrees 
associated with verbal skills had disappeared. 
 Putting the two effects together, we show in Figure 4c that the net impact of falling  
verbal skills and rising quantitative skills has been to lower the supply of doctorates since the late 
70s and to lower the supply of professionals since the mid 80s. 
B. Estimated Returns to Postgraduate Education 
 Table 4 reports the results from Ordinary Least Squares and Two-stage estimation of the 
log earnings equation (1).   Both sets of results correct for sample weights.  Least squares 
estimates of returns to graduate education are positive and significant.  However, the implied 
annual returns are small.  Assuming a Master’s program takes two years and a PhD program 
takes 6, implied annual returns are only 5.6% and 4.1% respectively.11  Annualized returns to 
professional degrees are more reasonable at 13.9%, assuming a four year program.  There is a 
significant positive return to majors with higher GRE mathematics scores but a significant 
reduction in earnings from majors with higher GRE verbal skills.  There is a significant premium 
for postgraduate degrees in business and a significant discount for postgraduate degrees in the 
sciences. 
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 Controlling for the likely endogeneity of the schooling choices raises the measured 
returns to advanced degrees.12  The implied annual return to a Master’s degree rises to 7.3%, 
about the lower bound of the corrected returns reported by Card (1999).  The returns to a Ph.D. 
rise to 12.8%, toward the upper bound of the corrected returns reported by Card.  The annualized 
return to a professional degree rises to 16.6%.13  These estimates seem much more plauisible 
than the very low returns obtained from least squares estimates and seem more consistent with 
the presumption that technological change has led to rising returns to skill. 
 Returning to the two alternative possibilities discussed at the beginning of the paper, our 
findings suggest that least squares estimates of returns to postgraduate training are biased 
downward.  Those who do not go on to graduate school are drawn atypically from the upper tail 
of the GRE quantitative distribution and the lower tail of the GRE verbal distribution, both of 
which are expected to raise their earnings.  On the other hand, those who go on to graduate 
school are drawn disproportionately from the lower tail of the quantitative GRE distribution and 
from the upper tail of the GRE verbal distribution, both of which lower their opportunity costs of 
graduate school.  Consequently, average earnings of bachelor’s degree recipients overstate the 
opportunity cost faced by those opting to pursue advanced degrees, and so the observed premium 
of average earnings for postgraduate degree holders over bachelor’s degree recipients understates 
the true returns to graduate school.  Correcting for the sorting raises the estimated returns, as 
found in Table 4. 
 To illustrate the impact of changing GRE scores on observed returns to schooling, we 
simulate how GRE scores alter log earnings directly through estimates in Table 4 and and 
indirectly through their implied impact on the probability of receiving an advanced degree 
estimated from Table 3.  The results of the simulation are shown in Figure 5.  The direct effect of 
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a 10 point increase in the quantitative GRE score is to raise earnings by 2%.  However, the 
increase in average quantitative GRE score also lowers the likelihood of attending graduate 
school, which counteracts the positive direct returns to quantitative scores almost exactly.   
 Although the direct effect of average verbal GRE score on earnings is insignificant, there 
is an indirect impact on earnings through its influence on postgraduate training.  When verbal 
scores were rising, they had a substantial effect on earnings which has since reversed with the 
more recent slide in verbal GRE scores.  Combining the two effects, changes in verbal and 
quantitative GRE scores are responsible for only a 2% increase in relative postgraduate earnings 
between 1963 and 1993, a small fraction of the 35% increase in relative earnings for graduate 
degree holders shown in Figure 1. 
C. Unobserved Ability 
 In equation (3), we proposed that there would also be individual abilities within the major 
as well as the major average.  These unobserved individual abilities may also affect the 
likelihood of pursuing an advanced degree.  To test that hypothesis, we follow Rosenzweig and 
Schultz (1983) by collecting the residuals from the earnings equation. These residuals represent 
individual earnings of BA major recipients that are uncorrelated with education level, average 
verbal and quantitative skills in their major, or other demographic variables included in the 
earnings function.  They will also include random noise in the earnings function, so they will 
measure the unobserved ability with error.  An auxiliary multinomial logit estimation of 
education choices on the earnings residuals will illustrate the direction of the effect of 
unobserved ability to earn income on the probability of seeking graduate or professional 
education.  Note that the measurement error inherent in this method will tend to bias the 
coefficients toward zero.  
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 Table 5 reports the estimated marginal effect of the earnings residual on the probability of 
pursuing each degree. Those with higher unobserved ability to earn income were more likely to 
pursue advanced degrees of all types, especially professional degrees.  Consequently, unobserved 
abilities sort BA recipients in the opposite direction as sorting on observed quantitative skills, 
and in the same direction as sorting on observed verbal skills.  These individuals with atypically 
large unobserved skill endowments particularly sort toward law and medical schools.   
D.  Returns by Undergraduate Major 
 We can also apply our procedure to estimate returns to postgraduate education for 
individual undergraduate majors.  Our degree levels are technically identified by parental 
education and time series information on fees and support.  However there is less variation in 
opportunity costs or returns within majors which may make it more difficult to generate precise 
estimates.  The results of the exercise are shown in Table 6.  In general, our findings confirm 
those of Table 4 that least squares estimates of postgraduate returns are biased downward, but 
our corrected estimates are frequently not precisely estimated.14 
V. Conclusions 
 Returns to advanced degrees are positive and significant.  Least squares estimates for 
returns to Master’s or doctoral education are quite low, on the order of 5% per year.  Estimates 
increase in magnitude after controlling for likely endogeneity of the choice of pursuing an 
advanced degree.  Our estimates of 7.3% return per year for a Master’s degree and 12.8% return 
per year for a doctoral degree are of comparable size to those estimated for lower levels of 
schooling.  Our finding of downward bias in least squares estimates of returns to graduate 
education are similar to the conclusions from estimated returns to lower levels of schooling. 
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 Our study points out an interesting role for cognitive skills in the market for advanced 
degrees.  Students in majors with higher average quantitative GRE scores are less likely to attend 
graduate school, even though such students presumably are more likely to be successful in 
graduate education.  The opposite happens for verbal skills—students in majors with higher 
average verbal GRE scores are more likely to attend graduate school.  This leads to a sorting 
effect whereby students whose cognitive skills would suggest lower earnings at the bachelor’s 
level are more likely to attend graduate school.  This sorting effect appears to be part of the cause 
of the downward bias in estimated returns to graduate education—the average earnings of those 
who do not go to graduate school overstate the opportunity costs of graduate education for those 
who do pursue advanced degrees.   
 Nevertheless, changes in verbal and quantitative skills over time as indexed by the 
changes in average GRE scores play only a minor role in explaining the large increases in 
relative returns to graduate and professional education since 1980.  While quantitative skills have 
large and significant returns, the positive direct effect of rising GRE scores on earnings is 
counteracted by the negative effect of improving quantitative skills on the probability of seeking 
advanced degrees.  Verbal skills have no significant direct effect on earnings and declining skills 
have tended to reduce the probability of seeking advanced degrees since 1980.  
 These conclusions are subject to the usual caveat that our instruments may not be valid, 
although our measures of the costs of graduate education perform as expected and pass 
overidentification tests, and we do try to control for unmeasured ability to a greater extent than 
has been possible in most studies.  Nevertheless, our results may still be subject to biases that we 
cannot control with the data at hand. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics: 1963-1986  (N = 67565)
   Variable Mean Std. Err.
Demographics Age 41.2 (0.027)
  Experience 17.4 (0.025)
  Male 0.723 (0.002)
  US Citizen 0.956 (0.001)
  Rural Background 0.319 (0.002)
Education BA 0.549 (0.002)
  MA  0.287 (0.002)
  Ph. D. 0.063 (0.001)
  Prof. Degree 0.101 (0.001)
  Posdoc 0.004 (>0.001)
Race Hispanic 0.031 (0.001)
  White 0.849 (0.001)
  Black 0.052 (0.001)
  Asian 0.066 (0.001)
  Native Am. 0.002 (>0.001)
BA Major Field Science Majors 0.342 (0.002)
  Engineering Majors 0.205 (0.002)
  Social Sci. Majors 0.326 (0.002)
  Business Major 0.032 (0.001)
  Other Majors 0.095 (0.001)
Earnings (1993 dollar) Overall 53,864 (113.319)
  BA 47,900 (161.490)
  MA 53,325 (208.694)
  Ph.D. 59,657 (165.362)
  Professional Degree 84,155 (727.269)
Parents’ Education Mother’s Education (years completed) 13.2 (2.45)
 Father’s Education (years completed) 13.8 (2.86)
Schooling Costs Med. School Tuition (1983 dollar) 7,371 (2710)
 Grad. School Tuition (1983 dollar) 2,423 (278)
 % of Grad. Students Self-Supported 26.3% (5.39)
Data Source: NSF 1993 SESTAT 
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Table 2: Average GRE Score for the major, by attributes of individuals in the major 
Individual Attribute  Verbal GRE Quantitative GRE 
BA  500.8 581.9 
MA  502.4 568.7 
PhD  508.2 573.0 
Professional Degree  515.4 555.7 
Science Majors  512.0 606.0 
Engineering Majors  469.2 649.5 
Social Science Majors  518.6 518.5 
Business Major  475.4 542.3 
Other Majors  502.4 507.5 
White  503.6 573.9 
Black  504.9 553.2 
Asian  497.1 604.0 
Native American 
Male 
Female  
506.9 
501.0 
509.0 
563.2 
585.3 
547.8 
Data Source: NSF 1993 SESTAT, Educational Testing Service 
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Table 3. Multinomial Logit Estimation of Higher Education Choices  
Variable MA PhD Professional 
Family Background   
Mother’s  Educationa -0.044 (0.019) 0.039 (0.019) 0.031 (0.03) 
Father’s Educationa -0.010 (0.018) 0.057 (0.018) 0.101 (0.03) 
Schooling Costs   
Medical School Tuition/100a -0.555 (0.54) -0.003 (0.006) -0.003 (0.009) 
Graduate School Tuition/100 -1.76 (2.28) -0.104 (0.025) -0.06 (0.04) 
% Self-Supporteda -.087 (0.019) -0.067 (0.02) -0.072 (0.03) 
Parent Ed 16+*% Self-Supporteda 0.004 (0.001) 0.002 (0.001) 0.003 (0.002) 
Graduate Records Exam    
Verbal mean/100 0.350 (0.098) 1.38 (0.10) 1.84 (0.14) 
Quant. Mean/100 0.033 (0.056) -0.51 (0.05) -1.58 (0.09) 
Foreign Student Ratio -0.442 (0.157) 1.59 (0.12) 1.64 (0.18) 
Undergraduate major   
Science Majors -0.658 (0.069) 0.052 (0.07) 2.202 (0.15) 
Engineering Majors -0.353 (0.096) -0.288 (0.10) 1.257 (0.24) 
Social science Majors -0.527 (0.056) -0.825 (0.06) 0.889 (0.13) 
Business Major -0.456 (0.095) -1.420 (0.18) -1.368 (0.55) 
Demographics   
Experience/100 0.434 (5.31) 0.234 (5.43) 7.73 (8.39) 
Experience squared/100 0.010 (0.12) 0.081 (0.12) -0.337 (0.19) 
Rural background -0.172 (0.03) -0.208 (0.04) -0.380 (0.06) 
Male  -0.244 (0.04) 0.333 (0.04) 0.667 (0.06) 
Citizen  -0.411 (0.06) -1.566 (0.06) 0.346 (0.12) 
Hispanic  0.006 (0.06) -0.208 (0.08) 0.098 (0.09) 
Black  0.002 (0.05) -0.241 (0.09) -0.138 (0.09) 
Asian  0.261 (0.04) 0.429 (0.05) -0.076 (0.08) 
Native Am. 0.129 (0.15) 0.277 (0.17) -0.550 (0.27) 
Constant 0.704 (0.87) -2.976 (0.93) -4.057 (1.38) 
Pseudo R2 = 0.078 
Standard errors in parentheses.  Tuition is in constant 1983-84 dollars.   
a Instrument used in second stage estimation 
Joint test of significance of five instruments: Χ2(15) = 725.6  
Data Source: NSF 1993 SESTAT, Educational Testing Service 
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Table 4:  Ordinary Least Squares and Two-Stage Estimation of the Log Earnings 
Function 
Equation OLS Estimates IV Estimates 
Variables Coefficient Std. Err.a Coefficient Std. Err.b 
Degree  
MA 0.112 (0.007) 0.146 (0.118) 
PhD 0.243 (0.008) 0.766 (0.103) 
Professional Degree 0.554 (0.013) 0.662 (0.081) 
Graduate Records Exam  
Verbal mean/100 -0.070 (0.020) -0.129 (0.301) 
Quant. mean/100 0.181 (0.012) 0.210 (0.008) 
Foreign Student Ratio -0.020 (0.028) -0.098 (0.038) 
Undergraduate Major  
Science Majors -0.036 (0.014) -0.055 (0.012) 
Engineering Majors  0.031 (0.012) 0.023 (0.009) 
Social Science Majors  0.037 (0.011) 0.055 (0.012) 
Business Major 0.118 (0.018) 0.140 (0.033) 
Demographics    
Experience/100 2.42 (0.331) 2.722 (2.32) 
Experience Squared/100 -0.027 (0.008) -0.039 (1.09) 
Rural  -0.084 (0.007) -0.075 (0.108) 
Male 0.170 (0.007) 0.158 (0.012) 
Citizen 0.108 (0.013) 0.176 (0.021) 
Hispanic -0.061 (0.011) -0.050 (0.032) 
Black -0.094 (0.009) -0.083 (0.030) 
Asian -0.088 (0.009) -0.100 (0.019) 
Native Am. -0.127 (0.034) -0.141 (0.025) 
Posdoc 
Graduate School Tuition/100 
-0.369 
-0.010
(0.011) 
(0.002)
-0.262 
-0.008
(0.040) 
(0.008) 
Constant 9.698 (0.109) 9.660 (0.022) 
R2 0.234 0.144 
N 67,565 67,565 
Robusta or bootstrappedb standard errors in parentheses. 
Overidentification test: Χ2(5) = 3.38.  Critical value at 0.10 level is 9.24. 
Data Source: NSF 1993 SESTAT, Educational Testing Service 
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Table 5. Marginal Effect of Individual Heterogeneity on Probability to 
Pursue Advanced Degree 
Dependent Variable Marginal Effect Std. Err. 
BA -0.224 (0.007) 
MA 0.029 (0.007) 
Ph.D. 0.038 (0.002) 
Professional Degree 0.157 (0.004) 
Data Source: NSF 1993 SESTAT   
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Table 6: Estimated returns to advanced degrees relative to the bachelor's degree, by undergraduate 
major 
 Exogenous Degree Assumption Endogenous Degree Assumption 
Major Master's Doctorate Professional Master's Doctorate Professional 
0.07 0.27 0.65 -0.41 0.68 0.68 
Biological Sciences (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.32) (0.35) (0.13) 
0.13 0.26 0.49 -0.52 0.94 0.85 Business/Social 
Science (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.24) (0.37) (0.14) 
-0.03 0.17 0.22 0.11 0.21 0.76 
Education (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.23) (0.64) (0.53) 
0.13 0.25 0.35 0.51 0.63 -0.58 
Engineering (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.17) (0.27) (0.61) 
0.11 0.18 0.51 0.39 0.24 0.96 
Humanities (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) ((0.37) (0.68) (0.54) 
0.06 0.17 0.57 0.16 0.21 1.33 Mathematical 
Disciplines (0.02) (0.02) (0.08) (0.22) (0.29) (0.37) 
0.08 0.20 0.44 0.98 0.45 0.59 
Physical Sciences (0.03) (0.03) (0.09) (0.44) (0.31) (0.33) 
Notes: Returns are coefficients on degree levels from weighted regressions of the form reported in 
Table 4 estimated over samples including only bachelor’s degree recipients from the specified 
major 
Standard errors in parentheses.  Estimates in bold indicates significance at the 0.05 level.  
Data Source: NSF 1993 SESTAT, Educational Testing Service 
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Figure 3: Simulated probability of selecting each degree type by average GRE score of the 
undergraduate major, holding all other variables at sample means, based on the estimated 
multinomial logit model. Data Source: NSF 1993 SESTAT, Educational Testing Service 
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Figure 4A: Simulated probability of selecting each degree type by 
historical change in average quantitative GRE score, all else equal
Data Source: NSF 1993 SESTAT. ETS  (1963 normalized to 1)
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Figure 4b: Simulated probability of selecting each degree type by 
historical change in average verbal GRE score, all else equal
Data Source: NSF 1993 SESTAT.  ETS (1963 normalized to 1)
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Figure 4c: Simulated probability of selecting each degree type by 
historical changes in average quantitative and verbal GRE score, all else 
equal
Data Source: NSF 1993 SESTAT. ETS (1963 normalized to 1)
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Figure 5:  Simulated Direct and Indirect Impact of Changes in GRE Scores 
on the Average Earnings of Bachelor's Degree Recipients, 1963-1993
Data Source: NSF 1993 SESTAT.  ETS  (in 1993 dollars)
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ENDNOTES 
                                                 
1 Past studies using instrumental variables have been criticized for the use of potentially invalid 
instruments.  For example, frequently used family background variables (Willis and Rosen 
(1979), Altonji and Dunn (1996), Deschenes (2002)) may be correlated with unmeasured ability, 
rendering them invalid.  In their study using twins data, Ashenfelter and Rouse (1998) found that 
family background variables strongly affected educational choices but did not affect earnings, 
exactly what one would want in an instrument.  However, as Card (1999) argues, even that is not 
sufficient to validate family background measures as instruments if family background is 
correlated with unobservable ability. 
 
2 See Ehrenberg (1992) for a review.  The most recent studies of which we are aware are Jaeger 
and Page (1996) and Graham and Smith (2005).  Earlier studies include Ashenfelter and Mooney 
(1968) and Taubman and Wales (1973).  There is a vast literature on incentives to enter and 
returns to specific graduate degrees, pioneered by Richard Freeman (1976 a, b; 1999).   
 
3 In the end, we drop graduate turtion as an instrument because it fails some of the diagnostic 
tests we employed to investigate whether it had explanatory power for earnings.  The other 
instruments we discuss passed all the diagnostic tests. 
 
4 We also investigated the performance of an ordered probit formulation which would relax the 
independence assumption.  The problem is that there is no natural ordering of professional 
degrees versus Master’s or doctoral degrees.  In practice, the ordered probit specification 
performed poorly.  It was unable to to distinguish between bachelor’s degree and Master’s 
degree recipients or between doctoral and professional degree programs.  The resulting predicted 
degree levels yielded unreasobable returns.  Consequently, we concluded that the independence 
restrictions implied by the multinomial logit specification were more consistent with the data 
than ordered alternatives.  Note that a nested logit that split out profession degrees from the other 
two might be the more appropriate specification but it would require information that would 
allow us to distinguish between the opportunity costs of and tastes for Master’s versus doctoral 
degrees, information that was not available to us. 
 
5   We concentrate on pecuniary returns to schooling, but we acknowledge that nonpecuniary 
returns to schooling are an important factor leading individuals to pursue graduate degrees.  The 
NSF SESTAT data does contain many variables that could potentially proxy for tastes, but it is 
not clear whether tastes are acquired from schooling oir whether they drive schooling.  The high 
correspondence between parents’ and child’s educatoin suggest that some of the demand for 
postgraduate education is nurtured. 
 
6 Note that even if available, the use of major-specific information on graduate tuition or support 
would reflect the individual’s decision of which graduate program to select, and so the major-
specific information would be endogenous.  It would also leave undefined the relevant expected 
postgraduate schooling costs for those deciding not to pursue postgraduate degrees.   Because 
undergraduates in a given major can select from many different graduate degree programs, the 
averaged information across degree programs is the more appropriate measure of the direct costs 
of additional schooling. 
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7 The Educational Testing Service provided this data for selected years:1963, 1974 to 1976, 1983 
to 1986. The number of majors included in the report varied from 21 majors in 1963; 92 majors 
in 1974 – 76; and 98 majors in 1983 – 86.  These were aggregated into 28 major groups to 
correspond with the majors reported in the SESTAT. The GRE did not report data on 9 of the 
majors 1963, and so the nearest included major was used: e.g. computer science was placed in 
mathematics; agricultural and food science was placed in biology; and so on.  Once consistent 
data series were generated for the four reporting dates, the values were interpolated to generate 
continuous values for the intervening years. As most average scores change very slowly, this 
process is unlikely to generate wildly inaccurate estimates of average scores by major. 
 
8 The proportion of foreign doctorate recipients by major for each year in the sample period is 
reported by the Survey of Earned Doctorates. We presume that the average doctoral program 
takes six years and that the percentage of foreign graduates completing the program is 
proportional to the percentage taking the GRE exam six years earlier. 
 
9 Parents education level variable is 1 if both parents are more than college graduate, ½ if either 
one of them is more than college graduate, and 0 if both are less than college graduate.  
 
10 Our estimated returns in the second stage did not change substantially when we altered the set 
of instruments. 
 
11 Jaeger and Page (1996) estimate similarly small returns to Master’s and PhD degrees under the 
assumption of exogenous education levels.  Their estimation method includes both years of 
schooling as well as dummy variables indicating degree, so our annualized results are not 
directly comparable to theirs.  Our OLS estimates are also very similar to those reported by 
Graham and Smith (2005) under the assumption of exogenous education levels.  Their focus is 
not on returns to graduate education, and so they do not discuss the low implied annual rate of 
return to Master’s or doctoral training. 
 
12  Estimates that also included parental education in the second-stage earnings functions yielded 
comparable estimates of returns to graduate and professional education. 
 
13 These are likely to be overstated in that we do not incorporate tuition costs into the estimated 
return to professional degrees, and so these returns are gross of tuition costs.  In contrast, tuition 
is often waived in doctoral programs, so those estimates are presumably closer to the true net 
return. 
 
14 The only conflicting estimate is that engineering bachelor degree recipients with professional 
degrees are estimated to earn less than those who stopped at the bachelor’s degree, although the 
coefficient estimate is smaller than its standard error.  However, less than one percent of 
engineering bachelor degree recipients completed a professional degree. 
